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Abstract
This paper examines whether the existence and the timing of real balance ef-
fects contribute to the determination of the absolute price level, as suggested by
Patinkin (1949,1965), and if they affect conditions for local equilibrium unique-
ness and stability. I show that there exists a unique price level sequence that
is consistent with an equilibrium under interest rate policy, only if beginning-of-
period money yields transaction services. Predetermined real money balances can
then serve as a state variable, implying that interest rate setting must be passive –
a violation of the Taylor-principle – for unique, stable, and non-oscillatory equilib-
rium sequences. On the contrary, when the end-of-period money stock facilitates
transactions, the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy and equilibrium
uniqueness requires an interest rate setting consistent with the Taylor-principle.
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1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary and fiscal policy is known to affect the determination of the
price level and, under non-neutrality, the real equilibrium allocation. While previous
contributions to this line of research have primarily considered monetary policy regimes
that are characterized by constant money growth (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983,
and Matsuyama, 1990, 1991), recent studies mainly focus on policy regimes summarized
by interest rate feedback rules, such as Taylor (1993), Benhabib et al. (2001a, 2001b,
2003), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) or Be´nassy (2000). Correspondingly, researchers
nowadays pay less attention to the role of monetary aggregates and increasingly employ
money demand specifications that allow to neglect money for the analysis of equilib-
rium determination (see Dupor, 2001, Woodford, 2003, or Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2004).
Given that fiscal solvency is guaranteed under all possible circumstances, there are two
prominent results in this literature. First, the equilibrium allocation is neutral with re-
spect to the absolute price level (nominal indeterminacy). Second, the Taylor-principle
ensures stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences. According to the Taylor-
principle (activeness), monetary policy should aggressively fight inflation by raising the
nominal interest rate more than the increase in inflation.
In this paper, I examine whether these prominent findings are robust to differ-
ent specifications of money demand, when prices are completely flexible. To be more
precise, I revisit the role of real balance effects and their timing for equilibrium deter-
mination, the determination of the absolute price level and for uniqueness and stability
of equilibrium sequences. I show, that if the beginning-of-period stock of money fa-
cilitates transactions and interest rate policy is contingent on current inflation, then
predetermined real money balances can restrict current consumption in every period
under interest rate policy. I.e. predetermined real money balances can serve as an
endogenous state variable of the economy, a key role of real money, which has been dis-
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regarded in the literature.1 In this case , a perfect foresight equilibrium displays nominal
determinacy: it is is associated with a unique price level sequence. Interest rate policy
should then rather be passive than active – a violation of the Taylor-principle – to avoid
oscillatory or explosive equilibrium sequences, such that a perfect foresight equilibrium
is uniquely determined (real determinacy). Notably, the unique determination of the
price level and the uniqueness of equilibrium sequences are 2 sides of the same coin. If
real money is a state variable, then the whole set of equilibrium sequences is indexed
with a particular value for initial real money balances, which results in a particular ini-
tial value for the price level, since initial nominal balances are given. Working forward,
this mechanism pins down uniquely the complete set of sequences for the absolute price
level and nominal balances under interest policy.
I set up a discrete time general equilibrium model with flexible prices, where real
money balances and consumption enter the utility function in a non-separable way,
that is consistent with a shopping time technology (McCallum and Goodfriend, 1987).2
I apply two different specifications about the particular stock of money, that enters
the utility function: Either the stock of money at the beginning or at the end of the
period is assumed to yield transaction services. The former specification corresponds to
Svensson’s(1985) timing of markets within one period, where the goods market is closed,
before the asset market is opened. Then, households rely on the stock of money carried
over from the previous period for transactions in the goods market. This formulation is
applied for example in Woodford (1990), McCallum and Nelson (1999) or more recently
in Persson, Persson and Svensson (2006). The second specification, which can be found
1This property marks a main difference of my framework to the specifications in Carlstrom and
Fuerst, 2001, who show that different assumptions of the timing of markets can affect the conditions
(real) equilibrium determinacy under interest rate rules.
2Feenstra (1986) and Brock (1974) show that a MIU formulation can be equivalent to more explicit
formulations of transaction frictions such as cash-in-advance constraints, real resource costs of transac-
tions or shopping time specifications. For an exact equivalence, real money balances and consumption
should enter the utility function in a non-separable way.
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in Woodford (2003) or Sargent and Ljungqvist (2004), can be interpreted as a short-cut
for a reverse timing of markets. I.e. households can always adjust their money holdings
to facilitate transactions. The resulting real balance effects are commonly neglected,
since they are typically found to be very small (Lucas, 2000 or Ireland, 2004). I show,
that the existence and the timing of real balance effects (not the magnitude) can have
substantial implications for equilibrium determination.
Under real balance effects and interest rate policy, a uniquely determined price level
is associated with real money being a relevant state variable and, thus, with a history
dependent evolution of equilibrium sequences, which crucially affects the conditions for
macroeconomic stability. This property has been disregarded in related studies where
money demand specifications are applied which relate to my end-of-period version (see
Benhabib et al., 2001a, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Woodford, 2003). Through-
out the analysis of stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences, I take into ac-
count that (stable) equilibrium sequences can be non-oscillatory or oscillatory. This
distinction is important since stable but oscillatory equilibrium sequences can hardly
be viewed as recommendable for a central bank that aims to stabilize the economy.
The main principles for equilibrium determination and stability under simple monetary
policy feedback rules and can be summarized as follows.
• For the unique determination of a rational expectations equilibrium and a con-
sistent price level sequence, i.e., for real and nominal determinacy, beginning-of-
period money has to enter the utility function, and interest rate policy has to
respond to current inflation. Neither an interest rate peg nor a forward looking
interest rate rule lead to this result.
• Under the beginning-of-period specification, an interest rate policy that reacts
to changes in current inflation has to be passive for equilibrium sequences to be
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uniquely determined and to converge to the steady state in a non-oscillatory way.
• If the end-of-period specification applies or expected future inflation serves as
the policy indicator, real balance effects turn out to be (almost) negligible for
equilibrium determination: The perfect foresight equilibrium is consistent with
any price level sequence, and the Taylor-principle is necessary for stability and
uniqueness of equilibrium sequences.
• Under a constant money growth regime, a perfect foresight equilibrium displays
nominal determinacy, but real money does not serve as a relevant state variable.
Remarkably, for the economy to evolve in a history dependent way, it does not
suffices, that monetary policy is history dependent. Equilibrium sequences are,
in any case, locally stable and uniquely determined.3
While these results are derived for the case where the labor supply elasticity is finite,
I further show that the assumption of an infinitely elastic labor supply, which is for
example made in Dupor (2001), or Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004), for a related purpose,
is not harmless for the local equilibrium properties under interest rate policy. For
example, I find that an equilibrium under interest rate policy and flexible prices is
then consistent with any initial price level, and that the well-established principles for
equilibrium uniqueness for a separable utility function (see Woodford, 2003) apply when
end-of-period money provides utility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model.
Section 3 analyzes nominal and real determinacy under flexible prices. In the first
part, I consider the case where the beginning-of-period stock of money provides utility,
while the results for the end-of-period specification are briefly summarized in the second
3This result relies on real balance effects to imply consumption and real balances to be Edgeworth-
complements. When they are Edgeworth-substitutes, constant money growth can also lead to real
indeterminacy, as shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003).
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part.4 For both specifications, I derive the implications for equilibrium determination
and local stability under current and forward looking interest rate rules, and for money
growth rules. The last part of section 3 discusses my findings and compares them to
results in related studies. In section 4 I list the main results when prices are set in a
staggered way. 5 Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with representative agents
and perfectly flexible prices is developed. I consider a money in the utility function
specification that leads to real balance effects and assume either that the stock of
money at the beginning or at the end of the period yields transaction services. Monetary
policy is either specified in form of an interest rate feedback rule or constant money
growth. To check for the robustness of the results for the former policy regime, I apply
contemporaneous and forward looking interest rate rules.
Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. There is a continuum
of identical and infinitely lived households. At the beginning of period t, households’
financial wealth comprises moneyMt−1 and nominally non-state contingent government
bonds Bt−1 carried over from the previous period. The households’ budget constraint
reads
Mt +Bt + Ptct ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 +Mt−1 + Ptwtlt − Ptτt, (1)
ct denotes consumption, Pt the aggregate price level, wt the real wage rate, lt work-
ing time, τt a lump-sum tax, and Rt the gross nominal interest rate on government
4My findings for the latter case relate to the results in Benhabib et al. (2001a), Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001), and Woodford (2003)
5The details of this analysis can be found in an accompanying working paper version, Schabert and
Stoltenberg (2005).
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bonds. Further, households have to fulfill the no-Ponzi game condition, limt→∞(mt +
bt)
∏t
i=1 pii/Ri−1 ≥ 0. The objective of the representative household is
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, lt, At/Pt) , β ∈ (0, 1), (2)
β denotes the subjective discount factor and At nominal balances, which will be defined
below. The instantaneous utility function is assumed to satisfy
uc > 0, ul < 0, ua > 0, ucc < 0, uaa < 0, ull ≤ 0, (3)
uca > 0, ucl = ual = 0, uccuaa − u2ca > 0, (4)
and the usual Inada-conditions, where at = At/Pt. According to (4) the cross derivative
uca is (strictly) positive, such that marginal utility of consumption rises with real money
balances. The resulting properties, i.e., non-separability and real balance effects, typi-
cally emerge under more explicit specifications of transaction frictions. As, for example,
shown by Brock (1974) or Feenstra (1986), a money-in-the-utility (MIU) function spec-
ification, which is equivalent to a specification where purchases of consumption goods
are associated with transaction costs that are either measured by shopping time or real
resources, is usually characterized by these properties. To be more precise, introducing
these transaction frictions in a corresponding model with a utility function v(ct, 1− lt)
would lead to real balance effects, which are equivalent to a MIU specification with
uca > 0, if (but not only if) the labor supply elasticity is finite (see the accompanying
working paper version Schabert and Stoltenberg, 2005). It should be noted that an
infinite labor supply elasticity will lead to be of particular interest in what follows.
To avoid additional complexities, I assume that the respective cross derivatives are
equal to zero ulc = ula = 0.
6 The last assumption in (4), uccuaa−u2ca > 0, is imposed to
6This implies that the instantaneous utility function u(ct, at, lt) can be written as f(ct, at)− g(lt).
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ensure – together with (3) – the utility function to be strictly concave. The conditions
in (3)-(4) further ensure that real money balances and consumption are normal goods,
i.e. that the utility function exhibits increasing expansion paths with respect to money
and consumption.
The variable At describes the relevant stock of money that provides – in real terms
– utility. Throughout the paper, I consider two cases, where At denotes money either
held at the Beginning of the period, Mt−1, or at the End of period, Mt :7
At =
 Mt−1 version BMt version E .
The B-version, which, for example, relates to the money-in-the-utility function specifi-
cations in Woodford (1990), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and is more recently applied
in Persson, Persson and Svensson (2006). It is consistent with Svensson’s (1985) timing
of markets assumption within one period where the goods market is closed before the
asset market is opened. This means that the representative agent in period t relies
on the stock of money carried over from the previous period for transactions in the
goods market – implying that a surprise inflation directly affects households’ utility.
On the contrary, in the end-of-period specification (E-version), which can for example
be found in Brock (1974), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), or Woodford (2003), the
stock of money held at the end of the period facilitates transactions. This formulation
corresponds to the reverse timing of markets, i.e. the asset market is closed before the
goods market is opened.
Maximizing (2) subject to (1) and the no-Ponzi game condition for given initial
7These specifications are related, but not identical, to those applied in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001).
In particular, they assume that the monetary aggregate, which enters the utility function, is either
given by At = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt − Bt + Ptτt or At = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt − Bt + Ptτt − Ptct + Ptyt. As a
consequence, money demand can matter for local uniqueness of the equilibrium sequences of inflation
and consumption under interest rate policy, even if the utility function is separable.
8
values M−1 > 0 and R−1B−1 ≥ 0 leads to the following first order conditions for
consumption, money, labor supply, and government bonds:
λt =
 uc (ct,mt−1/pit) version Buc (ct,mt) version E , (5)
it
λt+1
pit+1
=
 ua (ct+1,mt/pit+1) /pit+1 version Bβ−1ua (ct,mt) version E , (6)
ul(lt) = −wtλt, (7)
λt = βRtλt+1pi
−1
t+1, (8)
where it = Rt − 1 denotes the net interest rate on government bonds, λt denotes a
Lagrange multiplier, pit the inflation rate pit = Pt/Pt−1, and mt real balances mt =
Mt/Pt. Note that beginning-of-period real balances mt−1 enter the set of first order
conditions only in case B and only together with the current inflation rate, implying
that in principle, both versions are forward-looking. Nevertheless, I will show below
that beginning-of-period real money balances can restrict current consumption, if they
serve as a relevant state variable. The optimum is further characterized by the budget
constraint (1) holding with equality and by the transversality condition limt→∞(mt +
bt)
∏t
i=1 pii/Ri−1 = 0.
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms of mass one. Firms produce the
consumption good ct with the linear technology yt = ll. The only production factor
labor, supplied by households, is hired on a competitive labor market – implying that
profit maximization leads to zero profits and a real wage wt of unity. Total output
comprises private consumption.
The public sector consists of a fiscal and a monetary authority. I consider two widely
applied specifications for the monetary policy regime. The first regime is characterized
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by the central bank setting the nominal interest rate contingent on current or on future
inflation.
Rt = ρ (pit) , or Rt = ρ (pit+1) , with ρ
′ ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 1. (9)
I further assume that the steady state condition R = pi/β has a unique solution for
R > 1. According to the interest rate feedback rule (9), the response of the interest
rate to changes in inflation, ρpi, is non-negative. The second regime, is characterized by
the central bank holding the money growth constant Mt/Mt−1 = µ, where µ ≥ 1 :
mtpit/mt−1 = µ. (10)
The fiscal authority issues risk-free one period bonds, receives lump-sum taxes from
households, and transfers from the monetary authority. I assume that tax policy
guarantees government solvency (ricardian fiscal policy), i.e., ensures limt→∞(mt +
bt)
∏t
i=1 pii/Ri−1 = 0.
3 Equilibrium determination under flexible prices
In this section, I assess how real balance effects, the timing of markets and monetary
policy affect the determination of the price level and of the perfect foresight equilibrium.
As described in the previous section, I consider two versions of the model which differ
with regard to the stock of money that enters the utility function, i.e., the B-version
and the E-version, and I consider three types of monetary policy rules described by (9)
or (10). The equilibrium for a positive interest rate (Rt > 1) can then be summarized
as follows.
Definition 1 Given an initial money endowment M−1, a ricardian fiscal policy τt∀ t ≥
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0 and a monetary policy (9) or (10), a perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) consists of
set of sequences {ct, pit, mt, Rt}∞t=0 and a price level P0 satisfying
1. for the B-version:
ul(ct) = −uc
(
ct,
mt−1
pit
)
∀t ≥ 1, (11)
uc
(
ct,
mt−1
pit
)
= βRtuc
(
ct+1,
mt
pit+1
)
/pit+1 ∀t ≥ 1, (12)
(Rt − 1)uc
(
ct+1,
mt
pit+1
)
= ua
(
ct+1,
mt
pit+1
)
∀t ≥ 1, (13)
and for t = 0:
ul(c0) = −uc
(
c0,
M−1
P0
)
, (14)
uc
(
c0,
M−1
P0
)
= βR0uc
(
c1,
M0
P1
)
/pi1, (15)
(R0 − 1)uc
(
c1,
M0
P1
)
= ua
(
c1,
M0
P1
)
, (16)
2. for the E-version:
ul(ct) = −uc (ct,mt) ∀t ≥ 1, (17)
uc (ct,mt) = βRtuc (ct+1,mt+1) /pit+1 ∀t ≥ 1, (18)
(Rt − 1)uc (ct+1,mt+1) /pit+1 = ua (ct,mt) /β ∀t ≥ 1, (19)
and for t = 0
ul(c0) = −uc (c0,M0/P0) , (20)
uc (c0,M0/P0) = βR0uc (c1,M1/P1) /pi1, (21)
(R0 − 1)uc (c1,M1/P1) /pi1 = ua (c0,M0/P0) /β, (22)
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and the transversality condition.
Remarkably, the two versions substantially differ with respect to the relevance of the
price level. In the E-version the PFE is purely forward-looking, such that consumption
in the first period depends only on the fraction of the current values for the absolute
price level and nominal money (see (20)). Thus, the absolute value for P0 is irrelevant
and the PFE is neutral with respect to P0. In the B-version however, consumption
c0 relates to the fraction of the given initial value M−1 and the price level P0 (see
(14)). Then, the price level is non-neutral for the PFE, such that a particular set
of equilibrium sequences is associated with a unique price level sequence including a
particular value for P0. The following corollary states this substantial difference between
the two versions.
Corollary 1 Given a set of equilibrium sequences {ct, pit}∞t=0 and an initial value M−1,
the sequences of the absolute price level {Pt}∞t=0 and nominal money {Mt}∞t=0 are uniquely
determined by (14) and (11) in the B-version, while in the E-version (20) and (17)
define infinitely many pairs Pt,Mt consistent with a perfect foresight equilibrium.
Notice that if consumption and real money balances enter the utility function separately,
i.e. uca = 0, the entire consumption path does not depend on the concrete values of
the price level and nominal money – in both versions. Thus, the dependence of an
allocation on the price level builds on the existence of real balance effects and on the
assumption, that beginning-of-period money yields transaction services. To be more
precise, if uca 6= 0, my assumptions about the utility function ensure, that the condition
for the optimal intra-temporal substitution between leisure and consumption defines an
implicit monotone function, Mt−1/Pt = f(ct) in the B-version (see (14) and (11)) and
mt = f(ct) in the E-version ∀t ≥ 0, see (20) and (17).8 Thus, given M−1, a specific
8The derivative for this implicit function, f ′(•) = −(ull + ucc)/uca, is monotone increasing for
Edgeworth-Complements.
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value for consumption in the first period, is in the B-version associated with a unique
value for the price level, P0, while in the E-version, consumption relates only to a unique
value of the fraction M0/P0.
The dependence of a given allocation on a particular initial absolute price level is
often summarized by the notion “nominal determinacy” (see Benhabib et al., 2001a). It
is crucial to note that the role of the price level in the first period does not relate to the
unique determination of equilibrium sequences (including the inflation sequence) which
is summarized by the notion “real determinacy”. These properties are summarized in
the following definition, which corresponds to the definition applied in Benhabib et al.
(2001a).
Definition 2 The equilibrium displays real determinacy if there exists a unique set of
equilibrium sequences {ct, pit, mt, Rt}∞t=0. Given M−1, the equilibrium displays nominal
indeterminacy if for any particular set of equilibrium sequences, there exist infinite
many price levels P0 consistent with a perfect foresight equilibrium.
Remarkably, for a set of equilibrium sequences to be characterized by nominal determi-
nacy, it suffices, that one of the values c0, pi0, m0 or R0 is associated with a particular
price level in the first period P0. If uca 6= 0 and the B-version applies, real determinacy
(equilibrium uniqueness), is sufficient for the determination of P0, such that nominal
determinacy applies. However, in the E-version, the equilibrium displays nominal inde-
terminacy (see corollary 1) even if the equilibrium is characterized by real determinacy.
A PFE, which is characterized by real determinacy and, thus, a unique inflation
sequence, can be associated with multiple price level sequences, even if beginning-of-
period money enters the utility function. If, for example, there are no real balance
effects (uca = 0), the price level is neutral with regard to the determination of equi-
librium sequences {ct, pit, Rt}∞t=0 under interest rate policy. Thus, two different values
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for the initial price level together with an equilibrium inflation sequence lead to two
different price level sequences consistent with the PFE. Evidently, one cannot uniquely
determine a unique price level sequence if there are infinitely many equilibrium infla-
tion sequences. Independent of the existence of real balance effects, the PFE under a
constant money growth rule is associated with a unique price level sequence, whenever
{mt}∞t=0 is uniquely determined.
To summarize, under interest rate policy and if there are no real balance effects, the
equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy in both versions. Given real determinacy
and the presence of real balance effects, the equilibrium in the B-version exhibits nom-
inal determinacy, while in the E-version the equilibrium is in any case associated with
multiple price level sequences under interest rate policy. Whether real determinacy is
ensured or not depends on monetary policy.
In the following analysis, I apply Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) approach to the
analysis of a rational expectations equilibrium. For this, I focus on the model’s behavior
in the neighborhood of the steady state, and apply a linear approximation of the set of
non-linear equilibrium conditions. Throughout, I restrict my attention to locally stable
equilibrium sequences, i.e., to equilibrium sequences that converge to the steady state.
3.1 Beginning-of-period money
I start with the case where the beginning-of-period stock of money enters the util-
ity function. The deterministic steady state is then characterized by the following
properties: R = pi/β, −ul(c) = uc(c,m/pi), and uc(c,m/pi)
(
R− 1) = ua(m/pi, c). A
discussion of the existence and uniqueness of a steady state for R > 1 can be found in
appendix 6.1 . Log-linearizing the model at the steady state, leads to the following set
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of equilibrium conditions:
εcam̂t−1 − εcapit = (σl + σc) ĉt, (23)
σcĉt − εcam̂t−1 + εcapit = σcĉt+1 − εcam̂t + (εca + 1) pit+1 − R̂t, (24)
(εca + σa) m̂t = −zR̂t + (σc + φac) ĉt+1 + (εca + σa)pit+1, (25)
where z ≡ R/(R − 1) > 1, σl ≡ lullul ≥ 0, σc ≡ − cuccuc > 0, σa ≡ −auaaua > 0, εca ≡
auca
uc
> 0, and φac ≡ cuacua > 0, and f̂t denotes the percent deviation of a generic
variable ft from its steady state value f : f̂t = log(ft)− log(f). These conditions (and
the transversality condition) have to be satisfied by the equilibrium sequences for the
steady state deviations of consumption, real balances, the inflation rate, and of the
nominal interest rate, {ĉt, pit, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 and a monetary policy regime satisfying
R̂t = ρpipit, or R̂t = ρpipit+1, or m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit, (26)
where ρpi denotes the steady state inflation elasticity ρpi ≡ ρ′(pi)(pi/R) ≥ 0. Following
Benhabib et al. (2001), interest rate policy is called active or according to the Taylor-
principle if ρpi > 1, and passive if ρpi < 1. An active (passive) interest rate setting
leads to an increase (decrease) in the real interest rate in response to an increase in
the inflation measure. It should be noted that concavity of the utility function implies:
Υ ≡ σcσa − εcaφac > 0,9 which restricts the magnitude of real balance effects. A
closer look at the equilibrium conditions (23) and (24) reveals that the private sector
behavior is not independent of the beginning-of-period value for real balances m̂t−1,
as they are (implicitly) assumed to lower households’ transactions costs. Given that
m̂t−1 is predetermined, the households’ behavior can induce the economy to evolve in a
9I view this as a realistic implication, given that estimates of εca and φac, are usually found to be
small. According to US estimates reported in Woodford (2003), εca does not exceed 0.005 and φac ≤ 2.
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history dependent way, i.e. predetermined real money balances can be a state variable.
Defining [m̂t, ĉt, pit, R̂t]
′ ≡ x̂t, the following definition summarizes this property.
Definition 3 Consider the fundamental solution for the equilibrium sequences {x̂t}∞t=0,
that satisfies the equilibrium conditions (23)-(25) and one monetary policy rule (26).
If there exists a locally stable and unique fundamental solution of the linear functional
form
x̂t =

ηm
ηc
ηpi
ηR

m̂t−1 = Λm̂t−1 ∀t ≥ 0 (27)
with ηi 6= 0 for i = m, c, pi,R, then predetermined real money balances are an endogenous
state variable.
It is crucial to note, that if real money balances are a state variable, then not only first
period values x̂0 are associated with a particular first period price level. Instead, the
whole set of equilibrium variables is indexed with a specific value for m−1 a at each
point in time, i.e. x̂t = Λ.
t+1m̂−1, ∀t > 0. For a given initial value M−1, the set of
equilibrium sequences relies on a particular initial price level P−1. Since this mechanism
applies to each period, the complete set of sequences for the absolute price level {Pt}∞t=0
and nominal balancesMt}∞t=0 is uniquely determined. Evidently, if real money balances
are a state variable, the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy. But as will become
clear below, the reverse must not be true.
Yet, m̂t−1 enters the equilibrium conditions jointly with the current inflation rate.
Thus, predetermined real money serves as a relevant endogenous state variable, only
if the current inflation pit rate is uniquely determined, which implies real determinacy.
Given real determinacy, nominal determinacy applies, whenever the beginning-of-period
stock of money enters the utility function. But monetary policy is decisive for real de-
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terminacy, i.e. for the possibility to uniquely determine a price level sequence. In the
subsequent analysis, I will show that this requires the central bank to set the nominal
interest rate contingent on current inflation. Under an interest rate peg, ρpi = 0, an in-
flation sequence and, therefore, a price level sequence cannot be uniquely determined.10
I start with the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according
to an interest rate feedback rule. At first, I consider current inflation as the policy
indicator, R̂t = ρpipit. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium properties
for the cases where the labor supply elasticity 1/σl takes a finite value or is infinite.
Proposition 1 (B, Interest rate policy, R̂t = ρpipit) Consider that beginning-of-period
money enters the utility function and that the nominal interest rate is set contingent
on changes in current inflation R̂t = ρpipit.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , predetermined real money bal-
ances serve as a state variable. The equilibrium displays real determinacy and
local stability if and only if
(a) ρpi1 < ρpi < 1 for εca >
σa
2z−1 and σl > σl, leading to non-oscillatory equilib-
rium sequences, or ρpi ∈ (1, ρpi1), leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
(b) ρpi > 1 for εca <
σa
2z−1 or σl < σl, leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
where ρpi1 ≡ σl(εca+σa)+Υσl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ and σl ≡ Υ(2z−1)εca−σa .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, predetermined real money
balances do not serve as a state variable. Consumption ĉt cannot uniquely be
determined, while the equilibrium sequences {ĉt+1, pit, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally stable
and uniquely determined if and only if ρpi > 1.
10It should further be noted that a PFE displays nominal indeterminacy if there are no real balance
effects, εca = φac = 0. Nevertheless, one can always compute a price level sequence for a particular
initial price level and a sequence of inflation rates.
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Proof. See appendix 6.2.
Proposition 1 reveals that the requirements for local equilibrium stability and unique-
ness in terms of the policy parameter ρpi are not robust with regard to changes in the
elasticities εca and σl.
11 For finite labor supply elasticities, σl > 0, predetermined real
balances serve as an endogenous state variable. Correspondingly, passiveness (ρpi < 1)
– a violation of the Taylor-principle – is necessary for locally stable, unique, and non-
oscillatory equilibrium sequences (see part 1a). An interest rate peg, however, violates
the conditions in part 1 of proposition 1 and, thus, implies real indeterminacy. On
the contrary, if interest rate policy follows the Taylor-principle (ρpi > 1), locally stable
and unique equilibrium sequences are oscillatory, which is hardly recommendable for
a central bank that aims at stabilizing the economy. Thus, when beginning-of-period
money relates to households’ consumption, interest rate policy that reacts on current
inflation should rather be passive than active for macroeconomic stability and for the
unique determination of the price level.
To see this, suppose that inflation exceeds its steady state value and equilibrium
sequences are non-oscillatory.12 Given that the inflation elasticity is positive, ρpi > 0,
the nominal interest rate rises, which – ceteris paribus – causes households to reduce
their end-of-period real money holdings m̂t, by (25). According to (24), the expected
real interest rate is further negatively related to the growth rate of real balances. Thus,
an active interest rate setting – implying an increase in the real interest rate – leads
to a decline in the level and the growth rate of real balances, such that the sequences
of real balances and, thus, of consumption and inflation do not converge to the steady
state.
11Note that for the sets (ρpi1, 1) and (1, ρpi1) (see part 1a. of proposition 1) to be non-empty σl >
Υ[(z−1)εca−σa]−1 and εca > σa/(z−1), and, respectively, σl < Υ[(z−1)εca−σa]−1 or εca < σa/(z−1)
has to be satisfied.
12The latter property implies that current and expected future inflation are not negatively related.
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Notably, the equilibrium exhibits different properties if the marginal disutility of
labor is constant, i.e. if the inverse of the labor supply elasticity is zero (see part
2 of proposition 1). Then, the amount of labor supplied by the households is not
related to their consumption expenditures and and the marginal utility of consumption
is always identical to its steady state value (see 23). In this case, the Euler equation
and money demand reduce to a constant real interest rate R̂t − pit+1 = 0, and σam̂t =
−zR̂t + φacĉt+1 + σapit+1, such that the equilibrium is not associated with a unique
value for beginning-of-period real money and that current consumption ĉt cannot be
determined. Correspondingly, predetermined real money balances do not serve as a
state variable. The equilibrium sequences for ĉt+1, pit, m̂t, and R̂t are then locally
stable and uniquely determined for an active interest rate policy, which contrasts the
results for the case of finite labor supply elasticities, σl > 0, presented in part 1 of
proposition 1.
I now turn to the case where the central bank applies a forward looking rule, R̂t =
ρpipit+1.
Proposition 2 (B, Interest rate policy, R̂t = ρpipit+1) Consider that beginning-of-
period money enters the utility function and that the nominal interest rate is set con-
tingent on changes in future inflation R̂t = ρpipit+1. Then, consumption and inflation
cannot uniquely be determined and predetermined real money balances do not serve as
a state variable.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , then ρpi > 1 is a necessary condi-
tion for uniqueness and local stability of the equilibrium sequences {ĉt+1, pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are given by:
(a) 1 < ρpi for σl > σl2 and εca >
σa
z−1 ,
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(b) 1 < ρpi < ρpi2, for σl < σl2 or εca <
σa
z−1 , or 1 < ρpi2 < ρpi if σl > σl and
εca >
σa
2z−1 , for σl ∈ (σl, σl2) or εca ∈ ( σa2z−1 , σaz−1),
(c) 1 < ρpi2 < ρpi < −ρpi1 for σl < σl or εca < σa2z−1 ,
where σl2 ≡ Υ(z−1)εca−σa and ρpi2 ≡
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
Υ+σl(εca+σa)−zεcaσl .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0 , then the equilibrium sequences
{ĉt+1, Etpit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally stable and uniquely determined if and only if
ρpi 6= 1.
Proof. See appendix 6.3.
In comparison to proposition 1 the most fundamental difference relates to the role of
beginning-of-period real balances, m̂t−1. If monetary policy applies a forward looking
interest rate rule, households’ optimal consumption decisions are not affected by pre-
determined real money balances. I.e. real money balances are not a state variable
of the economy. The initial stock of real money balances m−1 = M−1/P−1 is irrele-
vant for the equilibrium allocation and thus, there are multiple price level sequences.
Correspondingly, current inflation can not be pinned down since it enters jointly with
m̂t−1 and the equilibrium is consistent with infinitely many values for current inflation.
Given that the current values for inflation and consumption can not be determined,
households adjust m̂t in accordance with their planned future consumption ĉt+1, imply-
ing that their behavior is not history dependent. On the contrary, if current inflation
serves as a policy indicator, predetermined real money balances restrict households’
consumption decisions and initial real money balances are relevant for the equilibrium
sequences ĉt, pit, m̂t, R̂t at each point in time: predetermined real money balances are
an endogenous state variable (see definition 3) and the perfect foresight equilibrium
is characterized by nominal determinacy. Remarkably in that case, by applying an
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interest rate rule, the complete set of nominal sequences, the absolute price level and
nominal balances, can be uniquely determined.
Under an interest rate rule featuring current inflation, it turns out that there is no
robust value for the inflation elasticity that ensures local stability and uniqueness. For
example, when the real balance effect and the labor supply elasticity satisfy εca >
σa
2z−1
and σl >
Υ
(2z−1)εca−σa , interest rate policy should be passive, ρpi < 1, while the inverse,
ρpi > 1, is required under εca <
σa
2z−1 or σl < σl (see proposition 1). When the central
bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on expected future inflation, activeness
ρpi > 1 is always necessary (but not sufficient) for uniqueness.
13 As in the previous
case (see part 2 of proposition 1), the equilibrium exhibits different properties if the
labor supply elasticity is infinite σl = 0 as described in part 2 of proposition 2. With a
forward looking interest rate rule, the model then reduces to a set of static equilibrium
conditions characterized by unique equilibrium sequences {ĉt+1, pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 for any
non-zero inflation elasticity ρpi 6= 1.
Under a money growth regime equilibrium determination is less sensitive. Ruling
out unreasonable parameter values, I focus, for convenience, on the case where the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of money is not extremely large,
σa < z = R/(R− 1).14
Proposition 3 (B, Money growth policy) Suppose that beginning-of-period money
enters the utility function and that σa < z. Under a constant money growth rule,
predetermined real money balances do not serve as a state variable. The equilibrium
sequences {ĉt+1, pit+1, m̂t, R̂t} ∀t ≥ 0 are locally stable and uniquely determined, and
there exists a unique consistent price level ∀t ≥ 0.
13Non-emptiness of the sets for ρpi requires ρpi2 > 1 and −ρpi1 > ρpi2 , which is fulfilled for the given
restrictions on σl and εca in part 1b and 1c.
14It should be noted that σa < z is just a sufficient precondition for the result in proposition 3 and
hardly restrictive if one assigns values for σa that relate to reasonable magnitudes of σc.
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Proof. See appendix 6.4.
A comparison of the results in the propositions 1-3 shows that the PFE displays real
determinacy, if and only if predetermined real money balances are an endogenous state
variable. This requires an interest policy contingent on current inflation. Remarkably,
the money growth regime leads to an equilibrium behavior being different from the
behavior under both interest rate policy regimes. On the one hand, the price level
can always be determined if real balances are determined, given that the value for the
nominal stock of money is known in every period. On the other hand, the initial values
for the inflation rate pi0 and real money m̂−1 are irrelevant for equilibrium determination,
implying that there are – for different initial price levels – multiple values for both which
are consistent with a unique set of equilibrium sequences {ĉt+1, pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0. I.e.
the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy but does not rely on predetermined real
money balances as an endogenous state variable. Put differently, for the economy to
evolve in a history dependent way, it is, therefore, not sufficient that monetary policy
is conducted in a backward looking way. Instead, it is the households’ consumption
decision rather than a restriction on the evolution of money, which is responsible for
the equilibrium sequences to depend on beginning-of-period money holdings. There is
an analogy to the role of physical capital in a standard real business cycle model with a
depreciation rate equal to one. Capital remains a relevant state variable, even though
the model (virtually) lacks an accumulation equation.15
15Consider a real version of my model, with perfect competition, a production technology satisfying
yt = stkαt−1l
1−α
t , where kt−1 denotes the beginning-of-period stock of physical capital and α ∈ (0, 1),
and a capital depreciation rate of 100%. Nevertheless, capital serves as a relevant state variable, i.e.,
kt−1 affects the equilibrium allocation in period t.
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3.2 End-of-period money
Next, I will briefly summarize the requirements for equilibrium determination under
the assumption that end-of-period money holdings enter the utility function. In this
case, the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy – unless monetary policy follows
a constant money growth rule. This specification has also been examined by Benhabib
et al. (2001a) and by Woodford (2003) for interest rate policies, and by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2003) for money growth rules. The deterministic steady state for this
version is characterized by the following conditions, R = pi/β, −ul(c) = uc(c,m), and
uc(c,m) (R− 1) = ua(m, c).16 Log-linearizing the model summarized in definition 1
for At = Mt at the steady state with R > 1 leads to the following set of equilibrium
conditions:
εcam̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt, (28)
σcĉt − εcam̂t = σcĉt+1 − εcam̂t+1 − R̂t + pit+1, (29)
(εca + σa) m̂t = (φac + σc) ĉt − (z − 1) R̂t. (30)
The conditions (28)-(30), the transversality condition, and a monetary policy rule (26)
have to be satisfied by the equilibrium sequences {ĉt, pit, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0. In contrast to
the B-version, consumption and inflation are independent of beginning-of-period real
balances. To put it differently, predetermined real money balances can not serve as a
state variable. Instead, the private sector behavior is entirely forward-looking in the
E-version with the consequence that the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy
under interest rate policy.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions for equilibrium determination un-
der interest rate policy.
16A discussion of steady state uniqueness is provided in appendix 6.1.
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Proposition 4 (E, Interest rate policy) Suppose that end-of-period money enters
the utility function and that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate.
1. When current inflation enters the interest rate rule, R̂t = ρpipit, the equilibrium
displays real determinacy and local stability if and only if ρpi > 1.
2. When future inflation enters the interest rate rule, R̂t = ρpipit+1, inflation cannot
uniquely be determined. The equilibrium sequences {ĉt, pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally
stable and uniquely determined if and only if i) ρpi > 1 or ρpi <
(
1 + 2(z−1)σlεca
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
)−1
for σl > 0, and ii) ρpi 6= 1 for σl = 0.
Proof. See appendix 6.5.
As in the B-version, equilibrium determination depends on the particular interest rate
rule. When the nominal interest rate is set contingent on current inflation, inflation
can be determined for all periods. Under a forward looking interest rate policy, one
can only uniquely determine future inflation. In any case, the initial price level and
initial real balances are irrelevant for a REE, implying nominal indeterminacy and the
absence of an endogenous state variable. Uniqueness of equilibrium sequences is further
ensured by an active interest rate policy, ρpi > 1, under both types of rules. For the
special case, where the labor supply elasticity is infinite, any forward looking interest
rate rule satisfying ρpi 6= 1 leads to unique equilibrium sequences {ĉt, pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0.
Turning to the case where the central bank holds the money growth rate constant, I
find that the equilibrium behavior closely relates to the one in the B-version.
Proposition 5 (E, Money growth policy) Suppose that end-of-period money en-
ters the utility function and that the money growth rate is held constant. Then, the
equilibrium sequences {ĉt, m̂t, R̂t} ∀t ≥ 0 and {pit} ∀t ≥ 1 are locally stable and uniquely
determined, and there exists a unique consistent price level ∀t ≥ 0.
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Proof. See appendix 6.6.
To summarize, the specification of money demand has substantial consequences for
the determination of equilibrium sequences and for macroeconomic stability. The
beginning-of-period value for real money balances is only relevant for equilibrium de-
termination in the B-version under a non-forward looking interest rate rule. In the
E-version, where the households’ behavior lacks any backward looking element, the
initial value of real balances is irrelevant for any policy regime under consideration.
Whether beginning-of period real money is serving as a relevant endogenous state vari-
able or not, is, on the one hand, decisive for a unique determination of the price level,
and, on the other hand, crucially affects the conditions for local stability and uniqueness
under an interest rate policy regime: policy should rather be passive than active, to
avoid unstable or oscillatory equilibrium sequences. Under a constant money growth
regime, however, local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences and a unique
price level sequence is ensured for both versions – regardless of the labor supply elastic-
ity. Given that the stock of money is known in every period, a unique sequence for real
money balances suffices to pin down uniquely the entire sequence for the absolute price
level. Evidently, this does not require the economy to evolve in a history dependent
way.
3.3 Related results
The main novel results in this section refer to the case where beginning-of-period money
enters the utility function and the central bank applies an interest rate rule, while some
results for the alternative cases correspond to results in related studies on real balances
effects and equilibrium determinacy in flexible price models. For example, my findings
for the E-version (see part 1 of proposition 4) resemble the results in Benhabib et al.
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(2001a) and Woodford (2003) for non-separable utility functions. They find that when
current inflation serves as an indicator, active interest rate setting is necessary and
sufficient for local stability and uniqueness. This, however, changes when beginning-of-
period money provides utility, since equilibrium sequences are then – except for the case
σl = 0 – unstable or oscillatory (see proposition 1). Thus, the literature has disregarded
the role of predetermined real balances as a relevant state variable, which substantially
affects the real and nominal determinacy properties.
If the monetary authority applies a constant money growth rule, then local stabil-
ity and uniqueness impose restrictions on preferences only in case where the stock of
money held at the beginning of the period provides utility. In particular, the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for real money balances should not be
too large (see proposition 3), which corresponds to the results in Brock (1974), Mat-
suyama (1990), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003), and Woodford (2003). Assuming that
end-of-period money provides transaction services, Brock (1974), Matsuyama (1990),
and Woodford (2003), show that local stability and uniqueness is ensured if consump-
tion and real balances are Edgeworth-complements, as in my framework. Furthermore,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
money can matter for local stability and uniqueness is guaranteed, as in proposition 3.
To unveil the role of non-separability for the results and to facilitate comparisons
with related studies (see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001), I further briefly discuss the
case where money demand is separable, εca = φac = 0. Then, the model reduces to
R̂t = Etpit+1, and σam̂t =
 − (z − σa) R̂t for the B-version− (z − 1) R̂t for the E-version .
while consumption is exogenously determined. When utility is separable, the conditions
for uniqueness under money growth policy, which are presented in proposition 3 and 5,
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are unchanged. In contrast to the results for the non-separable case, the particular stock
of money that enters the utility function is now irrelevant for equilibrium determination
under interest rate policy: Equilibrium uniqueness requires ρpi > 1 for R̂t = ρpipit and
ρpi 6= 1 for R̂t = ρpipit+1, which accords to the results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001).
As in the case of non-separable utility, current inflation cannot be determined under
a forward looking interest rate rule, while under a money growth rule inflation is only
indetermined in the first period.
4 Imperfectly Flexible Prices
In a framework with monopolistic competitive firms and staggered price setting as
developed by Calvo (1983), the initial price level belongs to the set of relevant state
variables.17 Under this specification, real balances serve as a relevant predetermined
state variable for all aforementioned policy rules, when the beginning-of-period specifi-
cation applies. If, however, the end-of-period stock of money enters the utility function,
households are entirely forward looking, and real money serves as a relevant state vari-
able only if monetary policy is history dependent, i.e., when the central bank applies
a money growth rule. Nonetheless, the determinacy properties under constant money
growth and sticky prices correspond to those under flexible prices. The main implica-
tions for equilibrium uniqueness and stability under imperfectly flexible prices are as
follows:
• When beginning-of-period money provides utility, interest rate policy has to be
passive to lead to locally stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
regardless whether current or future inflation enters the policy rule. An active
17Please refer to Schabert and Stoltenberg (2005) for details in that case.
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interest rate policy is associated with locally stable and unique equilibrium se-
quences if and only if end-of-period money provides utility and current inflation
serves as the policy indicator.18
• As under flexible prices, the central bank can ensure equilibrium sequence to
be uniquely determined, locally stable, and non-oscillatory under both timing
specifications by holding the growth rate of money constant, provided that real
balance effects are not extremely large.
5 Conclusion
Real balance effects typically arise when transaction costs are specified in a general
equilibrium model in form of shopping time or real resource costs, which are reduced
by money holdings. The fact that the equilibrium sequences for real balances and con-
sumption can then not separately be determined, is broadly viewed as negligible for
the assessment of monetary policy, given that empirical evidence suggests real balance
effects to be relatively small (Ireland, 2004). In contrast to this view, it is demonstrated
in this paper that the existence (not the magnitude) of real balance effects has sub-
stantial implications for the determination of a rational expectations equilibrium and
of the price level under interest rate policy.
However, for real balance effects to contribute to price level determination, as for
example suggested by Patinkin (1949, 1965), predetermined real money balances have
to serve as a state variable. Remarkably, these properties require that the stock of
money at the beginning of the period yields transaction services, which corresponds
to Svensson’s timing assumption (1985), that the goods market closes before the asset
18To be more precise, these results apply for finite labor supply elasticities. For the case of an infinite
labor supply elasticity there is a related paper by Brckner and Schabert, 2005. Assuming staggered
price setting and a specific functional form for utility, they consider the implications of the timing of
markets on optimal monetary policy under discretion.
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market opens. Hence, real money that has been acquired in the previous period restricts
households’ current consumption expenditures. Then, there exists a unique initial price
level that is consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium
displays nominal determinacy. In that case, interest policy should be passive to ensure
unique, non-oscillatory and locally stable equilibrium sequences – a violation of the
Taylor-principle. If, on the other hand, current consumption is related to the end-of-
period stock of money, then the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy, and the
well-known principles for uniqueness and stability of equilibrium sequences of a cash-
less economy (roughly) apply. Remarkably, these results highlight, that the existence
and timing of real balance effects jointly have substantial implications for equilibrium
determination.
If monetary policy follows a constant money growth rule, the conditions for equi-
librium uniqueness are likely to be ensured. Though the economy does not evolve in
a history dependent way, the entire path for the absolute price level is uniquely deter-
mined in both versions. These results suggest that a central bank that aims to avoid
multiple, unstable, or oscillatory equilibrium sequences in an environment where trans-
action frictions are non-negligible, should rather control the supply of money than the
nominal interest rate.
Yet, an optimal conduct of monetary policy will certainly require the supply of
money to be state contingent (as an interest rate feedback rule), which might be asso-
ciated with different determinacy implications than a constant money growth regime.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Existence and uniqueness of the steady state
In this appendix, I briefly examine the steady state properties of the model. I restrict
my attention to the case where the nominal interest rate is strictly positive, R− 1 > 0.
I further omit, for convenience, bars which are throughout the paper used to mark
steady state values.
When the stock of money at the beginning of the period enters the utility function,
the deterministic steady state is characterized by the following conditions: −ul(c) =
uc(c,m/pi)(² − 1)/², R = pi/β and ua(c,m/pi)(uc(c,m/pi))−1 = R − 1. For an inter-
est rate policy regime, it is assumed that the policy rule of the central bank, R(pi),
has a unique solution for the steady state relation R = pi/β, so that the inflation
rate can be substituted out. The first equation implies that c is an implicit function
of m, c = f(m), with f ′(m) = −uca(² − 1)[Rβ²(ull + ucc(² − 1)/²)]−1 > 0. Using
this, the third equation can be used to determine the steady state value for m with
ua(f(m),m/pi)[uc(f(m),m/(Rβ))]
−1 = R − 1. Differentiating the fraction on the left
hand side reveals that
dua/uc
dm
=
uc(²− 1)/²(uccuaa − u2ca) + ull(uaauc − uauca)
Rβu2c(ull + ucc(²− 1)/²)
< 0,
as I assumed concavity for u(c, a). It follows that a globally unique steady state exists
if and only if:
lim
m→0
ua(f(m),m/Rβ)
uc(f(m),m/(Rβ))
> R− 1.
Thus, steady state uniqueness relies on money to be essential (see Obstfeld and Ro-
goff, 1983): The marginal utility of real money balances should grow with a rate
that is higher than the rate by which 1/uc converges to zero when m approaches
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zero. An analogous line of arguments in case of a money growth policy leads to
the condition limm→0 ua(g(m),m/µ)[uc(g(m),m/µ)]−1 > µ/β − 1, where c = g(m)
is the implicit relation derived of the steady state condition −ul(c) = uc(c,m/µ) with
g′(m) = −uca(² − 1)[µ²(ull + ucc(² − 1)/²)]−1 > 0. The condition for existence and
uniqueness for the interest rate policy regime if end-of-period money provides transac-
tion services is
lim
m→0
ua(fE(m),m)
uc(fE(m),m)
>
R− 1
R
,
with fE(m)
′ = −uca(² − 1)[²(ull + ucc(² − 1)/²)]−1 > 0. If the monetary authority
applies a constant money growth rule then limm→0 ua(fE(m),m)[uc(fE(m),m)]−1 >
(µ/β − 1)/(µ/β) must be satisfied.
6.2 Proof of proposition 1
Consider a monetary policy regime that sets the nominal interest rate contingent on
changes in current inflation, R̂t = ρpipit.
First, I establish the conditions for local stability and uniqueness. Second, if the
labor supply supply elasticity is finite, I show that the existence of exactly one stable
eigenvalue (assigned to real money balances, ηm) implies non-zero coefficients ηi, i =
c, pi,R of the fundamental solution.
Reducing the model in (23)-(25) leads to the following system in inflation and real
money balances:
 pit+1
m̂t
 =
 σlεcaσl+σc + 1 − σlεcaσl+σc
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
σc+σl
−Υ+σl(εca+σa)
σc+σl

−1 σlεcaσl+σc + ρpi − σlεcaσl+σc
zρpi 0

 pit
m̂t−1

= A
 pit
m̂t−1
 .
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The characteristic polynomial of A can be simplified to
F (X) = X2 −XρpiΥ+ σl(εca + σa)− zσlεca
Υ+ σl(εca + σa)
− ρpizσlεca
Υ+ σl(εca + σa)
.
Consider the case the labor supply elasticity is finite σl > 0. In this case, the de-
terminant of A, det(A) = F (0) < 0, is strictly negative, indicating that exactly one
eigenvalue is negative and that real money balances are a relevant state variable. Local
stability and uniqueness then requires that there exists exactly one root of F (X) = 0
with modulus less than one. To examine the conditions for this, I use that F (X) further
satisfies
F (1) = 1− ρpi,
F (−1) = (1 + ρpi)(Υ + σl(εca + σa))− 2zσlεcaρpi
Υ+ σl(εca + σa)
.
Thus, for F (1) < 0 (> 0) and F (−1) > 0 (< 0), the model is locally stable, unique and
(non-)oscillatory, since the stable eigenvalue is negative (positive).
Thus, for F (1) > 0 and F (−1) < 0), the model is locally stable, unique and non-
oscillatory, since the stable eigenvalue is positive. If F (1) < 0 and F (−1) > 0, equilib-
rium sequences are locally stable and unique, but oscillatory, since the stable eigenvalue
has a negative sign. Suppose that the real balance effect and that the inverse of the
labor supply elasticity are large enough such that εca > σa(2z − 1)−1 and σl > σl,
where σl ≡ Υ(2z−1)εca−σa . Then, F (−1) can be negative if ρpi is sufficiently large. Local
stability and uniqueness with F (1) > 0 and F (−1) < 0, is then ensured by moderate
inflation elasticities satisfying ρpi1 < ρpi < 1, where ρpi1 ≡ σl(εca+σa)+Υσl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ . Alterna-
tively, local stability and uniqueness arise for F (1) < 0 and F (−1) > 0, which requires
1 < ρpi < ρpi1. Suppose that εca > σa(2z − 1)−1 or σl < σl. Then, F (−1) cannot be
negative and local stability and uniqueness then arise if ρpi > 1.
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To establish the role of predetermined real money balances as a state variable,
I need to show that the coefficients ηi, i = c, pi, R are non-zero if ηm is non-zero and
stable. Applying the method of undetermined coefficients to (23) results in the following
restrictions for the coefficients ηc and ηpi:
ηc =
εca(1− ηpi)
σ+σl
,
implying that for ε > 0 one not both coefficients can be zero. In particular, if ηpi is
neither zero nor 1, predetermined real money balances are a relevant endogenous state
variable for ρpi 6= 0. The money demand equation (25) implies that
ηpi = − ηmk
zρpi − ηmk 6= 0, 1
since k = Υ + σl(σc + σa) > 0 due to strict concavity and ρpi 6= 0 (no interest rate
peg).
Now, consider the case where the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0. In this
case det(A) = 0, indicating that the beginning-of-period value for real money balances
is irrelevant for the determination of pit and m̂t. It follows that one eigenvalue equals
zero and the other eigenvalue is larger than one, if and only if ρpi > 1. Then, the
equilibrium sequences for m̂t, ĉt+1, pit and R̂t for t ≥ 0 are locally stable and uniquely
determined, while ĉt cannot be determined. ¥
6.3 Proof of proposition 2
Consider a monetary regime in which future inflation serves as the policy indicator,
R̂t = ρpiEtpit+1. Substituting for consumption with (23) and inserting the forward-
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looking feedback rule, the model in (23)-(25) can be reduced to
 pit+1
m̂t
 =
 σlεcaσl+σc + 1− ρpi − σlεcaσl+σc
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
σc+σl
− zρpi −Υ+σl(εca+σa)σc+σl

−1 σlεcaσl+σc − σlεcaσl+σc
0 0

 pit
m̂t−1

= B
 pit
m̂t−1
 .
The characteristic polynomial of B is given by
F (X) = X(X − ρpizσlεca
(Υ + σl(εca + σa))(1− ρpi) + ρpizσlεca ).
Evidently, real money balances are not a relevant state variable, and one can only solve
for m̂t, Etpit+1, Etĉt+1 and R̂t ∀t ≥ 0. For a finite labor supply elasticity, σl > 0,
local stability and uniqueness requires the other eigenvalue (one is equal to zero) to be
unstable. A positive unstable root arises if monetary policy is active and σl > σl2 or
if 1 < ρpi < ρpi2 for σl < σl2 or εca < σa/(2z − 1). A negative unstable root exists if
ρpi > ρpi2, given that σl > σl and εca > σa/(2z − 1), for σl < σl2 or εca < σa/(2z − 1).
Thus, 1 < ρpi2 < ρpi < −ρpi1 leads to a locally stable and unique equilibrium with a
negative root for σl < σl or εca < σa/(2z − 1). When the labor supply elasticity is
infinite, σl = 0, then the Euler equation reads (1 − ρpi)pit+1 = 0. Thus, the model
displays local stability and uniqueness if and only if ρpi 6= 1. ¥
6.4 Proof of proposition 3
Under a constant money growth regime the nominal interest rate can be substituted
out so that the reduced form system of the model in (23)-(25) reads (where I omitted
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the exogenous state)
$1ĉt+1 − ($2 + 1) m̂t +$2pit+1 = −σcĉt + εcam̂t−1 − εcapit, (31)
εcam̂t−1 = (σl + σc) ĉt + εcapit, (32)
where $1 ≡ (σc(1− z) + φac) z−1 and $2 ≡ (εca(1− z)− z + σa) z−1, and m̂t = m̂t−1−
pit. After eliminating consumption with (32) and inflation with the linearized money
growth rule (26), I get the following difference equation in m̂t :
m̂t+1 =
z(σlεca + σl + σc)
z(σlεca + σl + σc)− (Υ + σlεca + σlσa)m̂t.
Once m̂t is determined, which requires an unstable root, one can solve for pit and ĉt ∀t ≥
1, while the initial values for consumption ĉ0 and inflation pi0 cannot be determined.
Local uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium sequences {m̂t, pit+1, ĉt+1, R̂t}∞t=0 thus
require
∣∣∣ z(σlεca+σl+σc)z(σlεca+σl+σc)−(Υ+σlεca+σlσa) ∣∣∣ > 1. If z(σlεca + σl + σc)− (Υ + σlεca + σlσa) > 0,
then the root is positive and unstable. Rearranging and using Υ = σcσa− εcaφac shows
that this conditions is satisfied for z > σa. ¥
6.5 Proof of proposition 4
Consider the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent
on changes in current inflation, R̂t = ρpipit. After substituting for consumption and
eliminating m̂t and m̂t+1 with the static money demand equation (30), one obtains the
following difference equation (where I omitted the exogenous state):
(d+ 1)ρpipit = (dρpi + 1)pit+1,
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where d ≡ (z − 1)σlεca[Υ + σl(εca + σa)]−1 > 0. Therefore ρpi > 1 is necessary and
sufficient for local stability and uniqueness of the equilibrium sequences of inflation pit,
real balances m̂t, consumption ĉt and the nominal interest rate, R̂t ∀ t ≥ 0.
Now, consider the case where future inflation serves as the policy indicator, R̂t =
ρpipit+1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0, then the model in (28)-(30)
reduces to:
pit+2 =
ρpi(1 + d)− 1
dρpi
pit+1.
Evidently, one cannot determine current inflation rate pit. One obtains a unique and
locally stable solution for expected inflation, and the current values of consumption,
real money balances and the nominal interest rate, if the eigenvalue of this equation is
positive and unstable, which requires ρpi > 1. Alternatively, ρpi < [1 + 2d]
−1 ensures
local stability and uniqueness, where one eigenvalue is smaller than −1. When the
labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, then uniqueness of a equilibrium sequence for
pit+1 ∀t ≥ 0 is guaranteed by ρpi 6= 1.¥
6.6 Proof of proposition 5
Under a constant money growth policy, m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit, the model in (28)-(30) can –
by eliminating the nominal interest rate – be reduced to:
εcam̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt, (33)
γ1ĉt+1 + γ2pit+1 + γ3m̂t = (γ1 +
σc + φac
z
)ĉt, (34)
where γ1 = σc(z − 1)z−1 > 0, γ2 = (1 + εca)(z − 1)z−1 > 0 and γ3 = (εca + σa)z−1 > 0.
Eliminating consumption with (33) and inflation with the linearized money growth rule
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leads to the following difference equation in real money balances:
m̂t+1 =
[σl(1 + εca) + σc](z − 1) + Υ + σl(εca + σa)
[σl(1 + εca) + σc](z − 1) m̂t,
which evidently exhibits an unstable root. Thus, one can uniquely determine end-of-
period real balances m̂t , current consumption ĉt, the nominal interest rate R̂t ∀t ≥ 0,
while inflation pit can only be determined for t ≥ 1 . ¥
References
Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohe´, S., and M. Uribe, 2001a, Monetary Policy and Mul-
tiple Equilibria, American Economic Review 91, 167-185.
Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohe´, S., and M. Uribe, 2001b, The Perils of Taylor Rules,
Journal of Economic Theory 96, 40-69.
Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohe´, S., and M. Uribe, 2003, Backward-Looking Interest-
Rate Rules, Interest Rate Smoothing, and Macroeconomic Instability, Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 35, 1379-1412.
Be´nassy, J.P., 2000, Price Level Determinacy under a Pure Interest Rate Peg, Review
of Economic Dynamics 3, 194-211.
Blanchard, O.J., and C.M. Kahn, 1980, The Solution of Linear Difference Models
under Rational Expectations, Econometrica 48, 1305-1313.
Brckner, M. and A. Schabert 2005, Can Money matter for Interest Rate Policy?,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (forthcoming).
37
Brock, W.A., 1974, Money and Growth: The Case of Long Run Perfect Foresight,
International Economic Review 15, 750-777.
Calvo, G., 1983, Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework, Journal of
Monetary Economics 12, 383-398.
Carlstrom, C.T., and T.S. Fuerst, 2001, Timing and Real Indeterminacy in Mon-
etary Models, Journal of Monetary Economics 47, 285-298.
Carlstrom, C.T., and T.S. Fuerst, 2003, Money Growth Rules and Price Level De-
terminacy, Review of Economic Dynamics 6, 263-275.
Carlstrom, C.T., and T.S. Fuerst, 2004, Investment and Interest Rate Policy: A
Discrete Time Analysis, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Clower, R.W., 1967, A Reconsideration of the Microfoundations of Monetary Theory,
Western Economic Journal 6, 1-8.
Dupor, B., 2001, Investment and Interest Rate Policy, Journal of Economic Theory
98, 85-113.
Feenstra, R.C., 1986, Functional Equivalence between Liquidity Costs and the Utility
of Money, Journal of Monetary Economics 17, 271-291.
Ireland, P.N. 2004, Money’s Role in the Monetary Business Cycle, Journal of Money
Credit and Banking, vol. 36, 969-983.
Ljungqvist, L., and T.J. Sargent, 2004, Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, 2. edi-
tion, Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Matsuyama, K., 1990, Sunspot Equilibria (Rational Bubbles) in a Model of Money-
in-the-Utility-Function, Journal of Monetary Economics 25, 137-144.
38
Matsuyama, K., 1991, Endogenous Price Fluctuations in an Optimizing Model of
the Monetary Economy, Econometrica 59, 1617-1631.
McCallum, B.T., and M. Goodfriend, 1987, Demand for Money: Theoretical Stud-
ies, in: The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate,
and P. Newman (eds.), London: Macmillan, 775-781.
McCallum, B.T., and E. Nelson, 1999, An Optimizing IS-LM Specification for Mon-
etary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
31, 296-316.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff 1983, Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Mod-
els: Can we rule them out?, Journal of Political Economy 91, 675-687.
Patinkin, D. 1949, The Indeterminacy of Absolute Prices in Classical Economic The-
ory, Econometrica 17, 1-27.
Patinkin, D. 1965, Money, Interest and Prices, 2. edition, New York: Harper and
Row.
Persson, M., T. Persson and Lars.E.O. Svensson 2006, Time Consistency of Fis-
cal and Monetary Policy: A Solution, Econometrica 74, 193-212.
Schabert, A., and C. Stoltenberg, 2005, Money Demand and Macroeconomic Sta-
bility Revisited, ECB Working Paper Series No. 458.
Svensson, L.E.O., 1985, Money and Asset Prices in a Cash-in-advance Model, Jour-
nal of Political Economy 93, 919-944.
Taylor, J.B., 1993, Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.
39
Woodford, M., 1990, The Optimum Quantity of Money, in: Handbook of Monetary
Economics, B.M. Friedman and F.H. Hahn (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland.
Woodford, M., 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Pol-
icy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
40
 SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2006 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
001 "Calibration Risk for Exotic Options" by Kai Detlefsen and Wolfgang K. 
Härdle, January 2006. 
002 "Calibration Design of Implied Volatility Surfaces" by Kai Detlefsen and 
Wolfgang K. Härdle, January 2006. 
003 "On the Appropriateness of Inappropriate VaR Models" by Wolfgang 
Härdle, Zdeněk Hlávka and Gerhard Stahl, January 2006. 
004 "Regional Labor Markets, Network Externalities and Migration: The Case 
of German Reunification" by Harald Uhlig, January/February 2006. 
005 "British Interest Rate Convergence between the US and Europe: A 
Recursive Cointegration Analysis" by Enzo Weber, January 2006. 
006 "A Combined Approach for Segment-Specific Analysis of Market Basket 
Data" by Yasemin Boztuğ and Thomas Reutterer, January 2006. 
007 "Robust utility maximization in a stochastic factor model" by Daniel 
Hernández–Hernández and Alexander Schied, January 2006. 
008 "Economic Growth of Agglomerations and Geographic Concentration of 
Industries - Evidence for Germany" by Kurt Geppert, Martin Gornig and 
Axel Werwatz, January 2006. 
009 "Institutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares" by Benjamin Bental 
and Dominique Demougin, January 2006. 
010 "Common Functional Principal Components" by Michal Benko, Wolfgang 
Härdle and Alois Kneip, Jauary 2006. 
011 "VAR Modeling for Dynamic Semiparametric Factors of Volatility Strings" 
by Ralf Brüggemann, Wolfgang Härdle, Julius Mungo and Carsten 
Trenkler, February 2006. 
012 "Bootstrapping Systems Cointegration Tests with a Prior Adjustment for 
Deterministic Terms" by Carsten Trenkler, February 2006. 
013 "Penalties and Optimality in Financial Contracts: Taking Stock" by 
Michel A. Robe, Eva-Maria Steiger and Pierre-Armand Michel, February 
2006. 
014 "Core Labour Standards and FDI: Friends or Foes? The Case of Child 
Labour" by Sebastian Braun, February 2006. 
015 "Graphical Data Representation in Bankruptcy Analysis" by Wolfgang 
Härdle, Rouslan Moro and Dorothea Schäfer, February 2006. 
016 "Fiscal Policy Effects in the European Union" by Andreas Thams, 
February 2006. 
017 "Estimation with the Nested Logit Model: Specifications and Software 
Particularities" by Nadja Silberhorn, Yasemin Boztuğ and Lutz 
Hildebrandt, March 2006. 
018 "The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills 
and educational quality" by Lydia Mechtenberg and Roland Strausz, 
March 2006. 
019 "Cheap Talk in the Classroom" by Lydia Mechtenberg, March 2006. 
020 "Time Dependent Relative Risk Aversion" by Enzo Giacomini, Michael 
Handel and Wolfgang Härdle, March 2006. 
021 "Finite Sample Properties of Impulse Response Intervals in SVECMs with 
Long-Run Identifying Restrictions" by Ralf Brüggemann, March 2006. 
022 "Barrier Option Hedging under Constraints: A Viscosity Approach" by 
Imen Bentahar and Bruno Bouchard, March 2006. 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
 
 
 
023 "How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope? The Laffer Curve Revisited" 
by Mathias Trabandt and Harald Uhlig, April 2006. 
024 "e-Learning Statistics – A Selective Review" by Wolfgang Härdle, Sigbert 
Klinke and Uwe Ziegenhagen, April 2006. 
025 "Macroeconomic Regime Switches and Speculative Attacks" by Bartosz 
Maćkowiak, April 2006. 
026 "External Shocks, U.S. Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
in Emerging Markets" by Bartosz Maćkowiak, April 2006. 
027 "Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup" by Bruno 
Deffains and Dominique Demougin, April 2006. 
028 "Technological Choice under Organizational Diseconomies of Scale" by 
Dominique Demougin and Anja Schöttner, April 2006. 
029 "Tail Conditional Expectation for vector-valued Risks" by Imen Bentahar, 
April 2006. 
030 "Approximate Solutions to Dynamic Models – Linear Methods" by Harald 
Uhlig, April 2006. 
031 "Exploratory Graphics of a Financial Dataset" by Antony Unwin, Martin 
Theus and Wolfgang Härdle, April 2006. 
032 "When did the 2001 recession really start?" by Jörg Polzehl, Vladimir 
Spokoiny and Cătălin Stărică, April 2006. 
033 "Varying coefficient GARCH versus local constant volatility modeling. 
Comparison of the predictive power" by Jörg Polzehl and Vladimir 
Spokoiny, April 2006. 
034 "Spectral calibration of exponential Lévy Models [1]" by Denis 
Belomestny and Markus Reiß, April 2006. 
035 "Spectral calibration of exponential Lévy Models [2]" by Denis 
Belomestny and Markus Reiß, April 2006. 
036 "Spatial aggregation of local likelihood estimates with applications to 
classification" by Denis Belomestny and Vladimir Spokoiny, April 2006. 
037 "A jump-diffusion Libor model and its robust calibration" by Denis 
Belomestny and John Schoenmakers, April 2006. 
038 "Adaptive Simulation Algorithms for Pricing American and Bermudan 
Options by Local Analysis of Financial Market" by Denis Belomestny and 
Grigori N. Milstein, April 2006. 
039 "Macroeconomic Integration in Asia Pacific: Common Stochastic Trends 
and Business Cycle Coherence" by Enzo Weber, May 2006. 
040 "In Search of Non-Gaussian Components of a High-Dimensional 
Distribution" by Gilles Blanchard, Motoaki Kawanabe, Masashi Sugiyama, 
Vladimir Spokoiny and Klaus-Robert Müller, May 2006. 
041 "Forward and reverse representations for Markov chains" by Grigori N. 
Milstein, John G. M. Schoenmakers and Vladimir Spokoiny, May 2006. 
042 "Discussion of 'The Source of Historical Economic Fluctuations: An 
Analysis using Long-Run Restrictions' by Neville Francis and Valerie A. 
Ramey" by Harald Uhlig, May 2006. 
043 "An Iteration Procedure for Solving Integral Equations Related to Optimal 
Stopping Problems" by Denis Belomestny and Pavel V. Gapeev, May 
2006. 
044 "East Germany’s Wage Gap: A non-parametric decomposition based on 
establishment characteristics" by Bernd Görzig, Martin Gornig and Axel 
Werwatz, May 2006. 
045 "Firm Specific Wage Spread in Germany - Decomposition of regional 
differences in inter firm wage dispersion" by Bernd Görzig, Martin Gornig 
and Axel Werwatz, May 2006. 
 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 046 "Produktdiversifizierung: Haben die ostdeutschen Unternehmen den 
 Anschluss an den Westen geschafft? – Eine vergleichende Analyse mit 
 Mikrodaten der amtlichen Statistik" by Bernd Görzig, Martin Gornig and 
 Axel Werwatz, May 2006. 
047 "The Division of Ownership in New Ventures" by Dominique Demougin 
 and Oliver Fabel, June 2006. 
048 "The Anglo-German Industrial Productivity Paradox, 1895-1938: A 
 Restatement and a Possible Resolution" by Albrecht Ritschl, May 2006. 
049 "The Influence of Information Costs on the Integration of Financial 
 Markets: Northern Europe, 1350-1560" by Oliver Volckart, May 2006. 
050 "Robust Econometrics" by Pavel Čížek and Wolfgang Härdle, June 2006. 
051 "Regression methods in pricing American and Bermudan options using 
 consumption processes" by Denis Belomestny, Grigori N. Milstein and 
 Vladimir Spokoiny, July 2006. 
052 "Forecasting the Term Structure of Variance Swaps" by Kai Detlefsen 
 and Wolfgang Härdle, July 2006. 
053 "Governance: Who Controls Matters" by Bruno Deffains and Dominique 
 Demougin, July 2006. 
054 "On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets" by Hans Gersbach and 
 Harald Uhlig, August 2006. 
055 "Reassessing Intergenerational Mobility in Germany and the United 
 States: The Impact of Differences in Lifecycle Earnings Patterns" by 
 Thorsten Vogel, September 2006. 
056 "The Euro and the Transatlantic Capital Market Leadership: A Recursive 
 Cointegration Analysis" by Enzo Weber, September 2006. 
057 "Discounted Optimal Stopping for Maxima in Diffusion Models with Finite 
 Horizon" by Pavel V. Gapeev, September 2006. 
058 "Perpetual Barrier Options in Jump-Diffusion Models" by Pavel V. 
 Gapeev, September 2006. 
059 "Discounted Optimal Stopping for Maxima of some Jump-Diffusion 
 Processes" by Pavel V. Gapeev, September 2006. 
060 "On Maximal Inequalities for some Jump Processes" by Pavel V. Gapeev, 
 September 2006. 
061 "A Control Approach to Robust Utility Maximization with Logarithmic 
 Utility and Time-Consistent Penalties" by Daniel Hernández–Hernández 
 and Alexander Schied, September 2006. 
062 "On the Difficulty to Design Arabic E-learning System in Statistics" by 
 Taleb Ahmad, Wolfgang Härdle and Julius Mungo, September 2006. 
063 "Robust Optimization of Consumption with Random Endowment" by 
 Wiebke Wittmüß, September 2006. 
064 "Common and Uncommon Sources of Growth in Asia Pacific" by Enzo 
 Weber, September 2006. 
065 "Forecasting Euro-Area Variables with German Pre-EMU Data" by Ralf 
 Brüggemann, Helmut Lütkepohl and Massimiliano Marcellino, September 
 2006. 
066 "Pension Sytems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk" by Lans 
 Bovenberg and Harald Uhlig, September 2006. 
067 "Testing for the Cointegrating Rank of a VAR Process with Level Shift 
 and Trend Break" by Carsten Trenkler, Pentti Saikkonen and Helmut 
 Lütkepohl, September 2006. 
068 "Integral Options in Models with Jumps" by Pavel V. Gapeev, September 
 2006. 
069 "Constrained General Regression in Pseudo-Sobolev Spaces with 
 Application to Option Pricing" by Zdeněk Hlávka and Michal Pešta, 
 September 2006. 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 070 "The Welfare Enhancing Effects of a Selfish Government in the  Presence 
 of Uninsurable, Idiosyncratic Risk" by R. Anton Braun and Harald 
 Uhlig, September 2006. 
071 "Color Harmonization in Car Manufacturing Process" by Anton 
 Andriyashin, Michal Benko, Wolfgang Härdle, Roman Timofeev and Uwe 
 Ziegenhagen, October 2006. 
072 "Optimal Interest Rate Stabilization in a Basic Sticky-Price Model" by 
 Matthias Paustian and Christian Stoltenberg, October 2006. 
073 "Real Balance Effects, Timing and Equilibrium Determination" by 
 Christian Stoltenberg, October 2006. 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
